In companies with different ownership structures, majority shareholders and minority shareholders have different behaviors in the supervision of managerial personnel. This paper adopts game theory to analyze their behaviors, reveals the roles of majority and minority shareholders in the process of addressing principal-agent problems, and puts forward measures to solve principal-agent problems.
Introduction
Under different ownership structures, interest conflicts between majority and minority shareholders vary; conflicts between shareholders and company managers are also different. How to reasonably resolve these conflicts is a core issue in the financial governance and the management of companies. In theoretical research, following approaches should be adopted. Under the highly dispersed ownership structure, the goal of corporate management and corporate financial governance is to find an effective incentive and supervision system to maximize shareholders' rights and interests; under the centralized ownership structure, corporate governance and corporate financial governance should focus on resolving the dual principal-agent problem include the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, and conflicts of interests between majority and minority shareholders. The reform of non-tradable shares has changed the past situation of only one dominant shareholder in the company. After the reform of non-tradable shares, many ownership structures have formed, such as "1 majority shareholder and N minority shareholders", "N majority shareholders and N minority shareholders" and "N minority shareholders". Under different ownership structures, shareholders' supervision on the managerial personnel may be different. It is of great significance to analyze the different roles of diversified shareholders in corporate governance and the supervision of managers through game theory, and find out methods which can solve the agency problem between shareholders and the management layer as well as the agency problem between majority shareholders and minority shareholders.
Small and Medium Shareholders' "Free-Riding" Behaviors under the Dispersed Ownership Structure
In companies with dispersed ownership structure, individual shareholders have three approaches to participate in corporate governance: forming a group with other shareholders and participating in corporate governance, so as to solve the agency problem of the management layer; "voting with feet"; turning a blind eye to the infringement of their interests. Individual shareholders' game processes in corporate governance and supervision of managers are as follows.
Hypothesis 1: the share held by a single shareholder is i β (i=1, 2, 3... N); his effort in supervising managerial personnel is i P (i=1, 2, 3... N); the cost is C = (P )
increasing function of P i . Under the dispersed ownership structure, cash flow rights are not centralized; it is difficult for individual small and medium shareholders to supervise managers'
behaviors. Therefore, in order to effectively supervise corporate management, minority shareholders must take collective action. Then the cost of supervision will become For shareholder 1, he assumes that most other shareholders have joined the supervision group; the supervision of managers has been carried out effectively. Then he weighs advantages and disadvantages and chooses the optimal strategy. This is a static game problem with complete information.
If he chooses to join the supervision group, the earning will be In another case, shareholder 1 assumes that most other shareholders have not joined the supervision group and the supervision of managers has not been carried out effectively. If he chooses to join the supervision group, the income will be
chooses not to join the supervision group, the earning will be 0. Obviously, the best strategy is still not to join the supervision group. From above analysis, it can be seen that in companies with highly dispersed ownership structures, shareholders have no motivations in supervising managers' behaviors. In reality, shareholders are more reluctant to take the initiative in supervising since the joint supervision of shareholders requires more transaction costs. "Free-riding" and "voting with feet" are best strategies.
Minority Shareholders' "Free-Riding" Behaviors under the Highly Concentrated Ownership Structure
In companies with centralized ownership structure, controlling shareholders and individual minority shareholders take following game strategies in corporate governance and combating infringement.
Hypothesis 1: the stock of controlling shareholders is α ; the share of a single minority Under the ownership structure of controlling shareholders, we can regard the process as a two-stage static game model. Since controlling shareholders take the leading role in enterprises, small and medium shareholders usually observe their behaviors first and then make their own choice.
Controlling shareholders can choose to supervise managers' behaviors or not. Situation 1: If the controlling shareholders choose to supervise, minority shareholders have two choices; supervision and non-supervision.
If both controlling shareholders and minority shareholders choose to supervise, the earnings functions will be: . In order to maximize their own interests, rational small and medium shareholders will choose not to supervise. Situation 2: If the controlling shareholders choose not to supervise, minority shareholders still have two choices, supervision and non-supervision.
The controlling shareholder chooses not to supervise while minority shareholder chooses to supervise. Under this ownership structure, it is difficult of minority shareholders to supervise managers' behaviors effectively because of their limited shares; their income functions will be: Therefore, rational small and medium shareholders will not supervise in order to maximize their interests.
Minority Shareholders' "Free-Riding" Behaviors in Companies with Several Relative Controlling Shareholders
In companies with relatively centralized ownership structure, a single controlling shareholder cannot make a significant impact on the resolution of shareholders' meeting through the appointment or removal of board members or other means. But two or a few relative controlling shareholders together can have enough shares to significantly impact the resolution of shareholders' meeting through the appointment or removal of board members or other means. Because of the high cost of "voting by foot" and the high risks of company lose due to managers' poor operation, several shareholders may choose to supervise the managerial personnel jointly. In this case, the game process of relative controlling shareholders and individual minority shareholders in corporate governance and supervision of managers are as follows. We can consider the game process under this ownership structure as a two-stage dynamic game model. Relative controlling shareholders need to consider shareholders' groups and transaction costs, and then make their choices. Afterwards, according to the relative controlling shareholders' decision, small and medium shareholders make their own choices.
For relative controlling shareholders, there are two choices: supervision and non supervision.
If relative controlling shareholders choose to supervise, 
Analyses of Game Results and Suggestions
Following conclusions can be drawn from above analyses.
(1) Regardless of ownership structure, minority shareholders have little enthusiasm in participating in corporate governance. On one hand, small and medium shareholders have few shares; participation in corporate governance has high cost and low income. On the other hand, they can reduce risks by "voting with feet" when their rights and interests are infringed. (2) The share transfer of controlling shareholders and relative controlling shareholders is restricted by the market and relevant regulations. Majority shareholders have motivations in participating in corporate governance and gaining benefits from the growth of the company. In the face of possible principal-agent problems of the management layer, they are actively involved in the supervision of managers. In the process of corporate governance, controlling shareholders and relative controlling shareholders can supervise and control the behaviors of managers, since they have information superiority and strong power (power obtained by holding more shares). (3) The "free-riding" behaviors of small and medium shareholders increase the costs of controlling shareholders and relative controlling shareholders in corporate governance, while the benefits are shared by all stockholders. In spite of contributions, major shareholders do not have normal channels to obtain benefits. Controlling shareholders and relative controlling shareholders may seek for control benefits from other channels. Since controlling shareholders and relative controlling shareholders have paid more costs in corporate governance but have no special compensation, and they have gained information superiority and super control power in the process of corporate governance, they objectively ask for cost reimbursement. Some majority shareholders even infringe the interests of minority shareholders in this process.
In the process of corporate governance, to solve the problem of dual agency, minority shareholders' costs in participating in corporate governance should be reduced; the cost of controlling shareholders and relative controlling shareholders should be compensated. A mechanism needs to be established to protect the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders. First, small and medium shareholders need convenient and low cost channels to exercise their supervisory powers, so as to increase their enthusiasm in corporate governance and reduce free-riding behaviors. Second, reasonable control benefit mechanism and compensation mechanism should be built for controlling shareholders and relative controlling shareholders. Third, supervision departments in the securities market should strengthen supervision and punish these controlling and relative controlling shareholders which violate regulations or infringe the benefits of small and medium shareholders; a mechanism should be established and improved to compensate minority shareholders with impairment of benefit.
